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Abstract
This project is about the design of
cryptographic schemes that are
secure even if implemented on not-secure devices. The motivation for
this problem comes from an
observation that most of the real-life attacks on cryptographic devices
do not break their
mathematical foundations, but exploit vulnerabilities of their
implementations. This concerns both the
cryptographic software executed on PCs (that can be attacked by
viruses), and the implementations on
hardware (that can be subject to the side-channel attacks).
Traditionally fixing this problem was left
to the practitioners, since it was a common belief that theory cannot
be of any help here. However, new
exciting results in cryptography suggest that this view was too
pessimistic: there exist methods to
design cryptographic protocols in such a way that they are secure even
if the hardware on which they are
executed cannot be fully trusted.
The goal of this project is to investigate these methods further, unify
them in a solid mathematical theory (many of them were developed
independently), and propose new
ideas in this area. The project will be mostly theoretical (although
some practical experiments may be
performed). Our main interest lies within the theory of private
circuits, bounded-retrieval
model, physically-observable
cryptography, and human-assisted
cryptography. We
view these theories just as the
departing points, since the area is very fresh and we expect to soon
witness completely new ideas
in this field
slides [ppt,pdf]
Relevant
publications by the principal investigator
- Stefan Dziembowski and Krzysztof
Pietrzak
Leakage-Resilient
Cryptography in the Standard Model
accepted to 49th
Annual
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) 2008
preliminary version
is available here.
- Stefan Dziembowski and Krzysztof
Pietrzak
Intrusion-Resilient
Secret Sharing
48th Annual
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) 2007
- Stefan Dziembowski
On
Forward-Secure Storage
Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO
'06, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, August 2006
-
Some other relevant
publications
- R. Canetti, S. Halevi, and M. Steiner
Mitigating Dictionary
Attacks on Password-Protected Local Storage.
In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2006, volume 4117 of LNCS,
pages 160–179. Springer, 2006
- D. Cash, Y. Z. Ding, Y. Dodis, W. Lee, R. J. Lipton, and S.
Walfish.
Intrusion-Resilient Key
Exchange in the Bounded Retrieval Model.
In 4th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC
2007, LNCS, pages 479–498. Springer
- D. Chaum.
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True
Voter-Verifiable Elections.
IEEE Security and Privacy, 02(1):38–47, 2004.
- G. Di Crescenzo, R. J. Lipton, and S.Walfish.
Perfectly Secure
Password Protocols in the Bounded Retrieval Model.
In Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, volume 3876 of
LNCS, pages 225–244, 2006.
- D. Dagon, W. Lee, and R. J. Lipton.
Protecting secret data from
insider attacks. In Financial Cryptography and
Data Security,
volume 3570 of LNCS, pages 16–30. Springer, 2005.
- A. W. Dent and J. Malone-Lee.
The Physically Observable
Security
of Signature Schemes.
In Cryptography and Coding, LNCS, pages 220–232. Springer, 2005.
- R. Gennaro, A. Lysyanskaya, T. Malkin, S. Micali, and T.
Rabin.
Algorithmic Tamper-Proof
(ATP) Security: Theoretical Foundations for Security against Hardware
Tampering.
In
First Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2004, volume 2951 of LNCS,
pages 258–277. Springer, 2004.
- D. Harnik and M. Naor.
On the Compressibility of NP
Instances and
Cryptographic Applications.
In 47th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’06),
pages 719–728.
IEEE, 2006.
- Y. Ishai, M. Prabhakaran, A. Sahai, and D. Wagner.
Private
Circuits II: Keeping Secrets in Tamperable Circuits.
In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006, volume 4004 of LNCS, pages
308–327. Springer, 2006.
- Y. Ishai, A. Sahai, and D. Wagner. Private Circuits:
Securing
Hardware against Probing Attacks.
In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003, volume 2729 of LNCS, pages
463–481. Springer,
2003.
- S. Micali and L. Reyzin.
Physically Observable
Cryptography
(Extended Abstract).
In First Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2004, volume 2951
of LNCS, pages 278–296. Springer,
2004.
- F.-X. Standaert, T. G. Malkin, and M. Yung.
A Formal
Practice-Oriented Model For The Analysis of Side-Channel Attacks
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/139, 2006.
http://eprint.iacr.org/.
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